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Abstract
The danger of a dust explosion is difficult to avoid in process facilities where com-
bustible dusts are handled. To develop effective prevention and mitigation strategies,
it is very important to understand the interaction among dust explosion controlling
parameters and to assess the likelihood of an dust explosion occurrence. Six control-
ling parameters ( Particle Diameter, Minimum Ignition Energy, Minimum Explosible
Concentration, Minimum Ignition Temperature, Limiting Oxygen Concentration and
Explosion Pressure) are identified to model a predictive tool which can assess the
likelihood of dust explosion in a given operating condition. Experiments have been
conducted by the dust explosion researcher to understand the characteristics of these
parameters and the generated data has a substantial scope in estimating dust explo-
sion probability with the use of probabilistic approach. A conceptual framework is
developed to use the existing experimental data on dust explosion parameter to assess
the dust explosion prediction in a given facility. The model is further extended with
considering dust classes and a detailed implementation in specific process industries
are discussed with case studies. The proposed model can assess the dust explosion
probability in a given operating condition at a specific process facility. The assess-
ment can be very helpful to strategies effective prevention and mitigating measures
in process industries. Three case studies are discussed in this study to demonstrate
the real life application of the model.
ii
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to express profound gratitude to my supervisors, Dr.
Faisal Khan, co-supervisor Dr. Paul Amyotte for their invaluable support, motivation,
immense knowledge, encouragement, supervision and useful suggestions throughout
the research work. Their extensive support and wise guidance helped me to complete
my work successfully.
Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the dust explosion project team leader Dr.
Refaul Ferdous for his continues encouragement, insightful comments and important
questions. His knowledge and technical suggestions helped me to develop the model
successfully.
I would also like to gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by Natural
Science and Engineering Research Council (NSERC) through Strategic grant.
I thank my fellow lab mates in Safety and Risk Engineering Group (SREG): Nima
Khakzad, Muhammad Masum Jujuly, Yuan Zhi, Mashrura Musharraf, Raihan Mallick
and Dan Chen for the stimulating discussions, valuable ideas, encouragements, helps
in every means and for all the fun we have had in the last two years.
iii
I would like to specially thank my parent for supporting and encouraging me to pursue
this degree. I thank them for their love and support throughout the whole career.
iv
Table of Contents
Abstract ii
Acknowledgments iii
Table of Contents viii
List of Tables ix
List of Figures x
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Overview of Dust Explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Motivation of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 Objectives of the Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Novelty and Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Organization of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Literature Review 6
2.1 Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Definition of Combustible Dust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.3 Dust and Gas Explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Dust Explosion Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
v
2.5 Dust Explosion Prevention and Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5.1 Explosion Venting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.5.2 Explosion Isolation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5.3 Automatic Explosion Suppression (AES) . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5.4 Inerting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5.5 Process Equipment Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 A Model to Assess Dust Explosion Occurrence Probability 16
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.1 Dust explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.1.2 Mechanism and causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.1.3 Current status of dust explosion research . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.1.4 Probabilistic measure for dust explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2 Methodology for dust explosion probability assessment . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.1 Step 1 : Hazard identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2.2 Step 2 : Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2.3 Step 3 : Data analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2.3.1 Parameter classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2.3.2 Statistical analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.2.3.3 PDFs determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.4 Step 4 : Probabilistic modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.4.1 Joint probability distribution determination and inte-
gral limit specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.2.4.2 Conditional probability assessment . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.4.3 Total probability estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.5 Step 5 : Nomograph development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Model for dust explosion prediction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
vi
3.4 Applicability of the developed probabilistic model . . . . . . . . . . . 40
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4 An Industry Specific Dust Explosion Assessment Model with Case
Studies 50
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.2 Methodology for dust explosion assessment and mathematical modelling 56
4.3 Mathematical modelling of dust explosion assessment . . . . . . . . . 56
4.4 Model testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.1 Data collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.2 Data analysis and PDFs determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.4.3 Identification of integral limits and CDFs determination . . . . 60
4.4.4 Dust explosion assessment in a given operating condition . . . 61
4.5 Identified dust classes and case studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.5.1 Dust class 1: Food feed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.5.1.1 Case study: Sugar dust explosion and fire . . . . . . 65
4.5.2 Dust class 2: Plastic, resin and rubber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.5.2.1 Case study: Dust explosion in wool factory . . . . . 70
4.5.3 Dust class 3: Metal alloys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
4.5.3.1 Case study: Aluminum dust explosion . . . . . . . . 73
4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
vii
5 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendation 81
5.1 summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
5.2 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
5.3 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
viii
List of Tables
3.1 Dust explosion parameter distribution identification . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.2 Nomograph calculation interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1 Dust explosion parameter distribution identification . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2 Nomograph calculation interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
4.3 Food feed: Dust explosion parameter distribution identification . . . . 64
4.4 Nomograph (food feed) calculation interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 Plastic, resin and rubber: Dust explosion parameter distribution iden-
tification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.6 Nomograph (plastic, resin and rubber) calculation interface . . . . . . 71
4.7 Metal alloys: Dust explosion parameter distribution identification . . 72
4.8 Nomograph (metal alloy) calculation interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
ix
List of Figures
2.1 Fire triangle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2 Dust explosion pentagon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.1 A framework for assessing dust explosion occurrence . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 The probability plot for particle diameter analysis . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.3 Probability density plot at a given condition for all the parameters. . 38
3.4 Posterior probability plot at a given condition for all the parameters. 39
3.5 Nomograph for dust explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.1 A framework for assessing dust explosion occurrence . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.2 Posterior probability plot at a given condition for all the parameters. 61
4.3 Nomograph for dust explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.4 Posterior probability plot for the parameters (dust class: food feed). 65
4.5 Nomograph (food feed) for dust explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.6 Posterior probability plot for the parameters (dust class: plastic, resin
and rubber). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.7 Nomograph (plastic, resin and rubber) for dust explosion . . . . . . . 71
4.8 Posterior probability plot for the parameters (dust class: metal alloy). 73
4.9 Nomograph (metal alloys) for dust explosion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
x
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview of Dust Explosion
The dust explosion hazard continues to represent a constant threat to process indus-
tries that handles combustible dust. A dust explosion can occur when particular solid
material is suspended in air and sufficient energetic ignition source present. Dust ex-
plosion is relatively less familiar to the gas explosion but the consequences are almost
akin, if the impact on surrounding environment, industrial assets and monitory value
are considered.
Unfortunately, dust explosion’s causation and severity is less familiar compare to the
gas explosion among industrial professionals [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010]. For gas
explosion fuel, oxidant and ignition sources are necessary while dust explosion requires
two more vital criteria: appropriate mixing and confinement. These five elements are
termed as dust explosion pentagon (Figure 2.2).
Five parameters are identified as dust explosion influential parameter: particle di-
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ameter, minimum explosible concentration, minimum ignition energy, minimum igni-
tion temperature and limiting oxygen concentration, whereas the maximum explosion
pressure represents the severity of dust explosion. Five essential elements ( e.g. fuel,
oxidant, ignition source, mixing and confinement) form a dust explosion pentagon
[Kauffman, 1982]. These five elements are represented by five influencing parameters
of dust explosion. When these parameter reaches to the explosible range, dust explo-
sion occurs [Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007]. Explosion may not occur if all parameter do
not reach the explosible range [NFPA, 2007]. The strength of the dust explosion is
measured in terms of severity. In the study, the maximum explosion pressure is the
indicator of the severity.
1.2 Motivation of Research
Dust explosion hazards are fatal for process facilities that deal with combustible ma-
terials. Research on safer plant design, safer work places and several standard safety
codes is available in contemporary literature and books.
Different safety methods have been proposed and analysed with case studies to make
process plants safer. Still, dust explosion is considered as a serious threat for indus-
tries dealing with dust materials.
In the process industry, major accidents are often initiated due to process upsets,
mechanical and operational hazards. Traditional prevention and mitigation strategies
are developed without considering facility condition. Existing safety models does not
consider the quantification of explosion proneness of a process facility at normal op-
eration condition. Thus, the models focusing on process hazards are not considering
2
normal operating condition while formulating prevention and mitigation strategies.
Industrial professionals and researchers are striving for more pragmatic and easily
implementable solution to prevent dust explosion phenomena. However, in the con-
text of quantitative assessment, a predictive tool to assess the explosion probability
in a particular industry is absent.
In this study, an effort has been made to establish a probabilistic model to assess the
dust explosion occurrence. The model is extended further to specific process industry
and implemented with real life case studies. The model is applied for three dust
classes: Food feed, plastic, resin and rubber and metal alloy.
1.3 Objectives of the Research
The main objective of this research is to develop a model that can be used to for-
mulate effective strategies in dust explosion prevention and mitigation. A predictive
model will help to improve system’s safety at design as well as at operational phase
of a process facility for a better and safer work place.
Based on this main objective, following sub-objectives are developed for this work:
• To develop a predictive model to assess the conditional probability for given
operating conditions.
• To provide a quantitative probabilistic assessment at a specific process facility
on dust explosion.
• To help in formulating effective prevention and mitigation strategies in the de-
veloped model.
3
• To develop a simplified tool called "nomograph" for easy and effective use of the
model.
1.4 Novelty and Contribution
The contributions of this study are described below:
• The proposed model considers six key parameters of dust explosion and a vast
amount of experimental data of these parameters are analyzed and their inherent
distributions are identified.
• Dust explosion parameters are classified into two categories: influencing param-
eter and severity parameter. A conditional probabilistic approach is used to
correlate these two parameters to understand the interaction between them.
• A probabilistic model is used to obtain the total probability of dust explosion
at a given operating condition.
• A simplified tool called ’nomograph’ is developed to analyze the facility con-
dition easily. The nomograph provides an easy interpretation of the complex
mathematical functions to understand the facility condition.
1.5 Organization of Thesis
This thesis is written in manuscript format (paper based). Outline of each chapter is
explained below:
Chapter 1 is a brief introduction on the concept of dust explosion occurrence and
prevention in process industries followed by the motivations and objectives of this
4
research.
Chapter 2 presents the literature review pertinent to this thesis. The literature review
mainly deals with the existing prevention and mitigation strategies in process facilities.
Chapter 3 introduces a conceptual model developed by the authors which uses con-
ditional probabilistic approaches. The model focuses on six key parameter of dust
explosion and based on the facility operating condition it can assess the likelihood of
a dust explosion. This chapter is submitted to the Journal of Hazardous Materials.
Chapter 4 presents the application of the conceptual model developed earlier by the
authors. Three case studies are discussed to demonstrate the implementation of the
model in process facility. This chapter is submitted to the Journal of Chemical Health
and Safety.
Chapter 5 concludes the study by a brief summary, conclusion and future scope of
research in this area.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Preface
Dust explosion is considered as a serious threat for the industry that use/handles dust
of combustible materials. Dust explosion may lead towards a serious financial losses
in terms of damage to the facility and personnel. To protect the industry from such
catastrophic accidents, substantial advance have been made through diverse research
and development. In dust explosion prevention and mitigation associated with other
challenges, there is a continuous strive for a perfect solution [Eckhoff, 1995]. Indus-
try always needs a practicable solutions which can be implemented easily to achieve
a better safety measure. The importance of inherently safer process design, better
understanding the mechanism of dust explosion, system safety and reliability systems
are the prime concern of improvement. But these areas lack the analysis in terms of
probabilistic modelling. A conditional probabilistic approach is discussed to better
understand the dust explosion occurrence. In this study, a newly proposed model
is described which can be used to asses the plant condition and hence taking safety
precaution according to that.
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2.2 Definition of Combustible Dust
According to the definition of BS2955 [BS1, 1958, Lees and Mannan, 2005], particles
with a diameter of less than 1000 µm (microns) are defined as powder and when parti-
cles have a diameter less than 76 µm (200BS mesh size) they are referred to as ‘dust’.
As per NFPA (National Fire Protection Association) ‘dust’ is any finely divided solid,
420 µm or less in diameter. Though BS:2955 [BS1, 1958, Lees and Mannan, 2005] and
NFPA 68 have different definitions for defining dust, Palmer [Palmer, 1973] proposed
that a particle with a diameter coarser than 1000 µm is be called dust [Lees and
Mannan, 2005]. The term dust used as per the NFPA 68 [NFPA, 2007] definition,
which is considered potentially threatening for the process industries. As the range
of the explosible particle size may be larger for a specific material, the particle size
distribution is considered in addition to the median particle diameter [Amyotte and
Eckhoff, 2010]. In this study, combustible dust is the prime focus. Any dust capable
of creating violent explosion when it is suspended in air in ignitable concentrations,
regardless of size, shape or chemical compositions is be called combustible dust [Amy-
otte and Eckhoff, 2010].
2.3 Dust and Gas Explosion
While most industrial practitioner are familiar with the mechanism of gas explosion
(e.g., the requirement of fuel, oxidant and ignition source, known as fire triangle), the
dust explosion is often considered less familiar [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010]. The pri-
mary difference between gas and dust explosion is the phase of the fuel. Dust particles
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are solid materials where the fuel is in gaseous state for gas explosion. According to
Kauffman [Kauffman, 1982] a dust explosion will occur when the explosion pentagon
is completed.
Figure 2.1: Fire triangle
Figure 2.2: Dust explosion pentagon
This pentagon consists of mixing, confinement, fuel, oxidant and an ignition source.
When these parameters reach a sufficient threshold limit (explosible range), dust
explosion occurs [Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007]. In addition, explosion may not occur if
all parameters do not reach the explosible range [NFPA, 2007]. Amyotte and Eckhoff
[Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010] made an comprehensive study on the basic difference
between these two and conclusively stated the causation for dust explosion.
2.4 Dust Explosion Mechanism
Dust explosion is a rapid and simultaneous combustion of flammable suspended par-
ticles [Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007]. The strength of the combustion depends on burning
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speed and the degree of confinement of particle [Eckhoff, 2003]. Dust explosion of-
ten follows a domino effect: a secondary explosion followed by a primary explosion
[Pickup, 2001, Lees and Mannan, 2005]. The first explosion may set a series of ex-
plosion called "domino effect" and leads toward a secondary explosion which are often
violent than the primary one [Lees and Mannan, 2005]. A secondary explosion can be
initiated due to entrainment of dust layers by the blast waves arising from a primary
explosion [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010].
Five parameters are identified as dust explosion influential parameter: particle di-
ameter, minimum explosible concentration, minimum ignition energy, minimum igni-
tion temperature and limiting oxygen concentration, whereas the maximum explosion
pressure represents the severity of dust explosion. Five essential elements ( e.g. fuel,
oxidant, ignition source, mixing and confinement) form a dust explosion pentagon
[Kauffman, 1982]. These five elements are represented by five influencing parameters
of dust explosion. When these parameter reaches to the explosible range, dust explo-
sion occurs [Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007]. Explosion may not occur if all parameter do
not reach the explosible range [NFPA, 2007].
The outcome of the dust explosion is measured in terms of severity. In the study, the
maximum explosion pressure is the indicator of the severity, as it is the most widely
used indicator of the explosion scenario for a particular dust. A brief description of
these six ( five influencing parameters and one severity parameter) parameters is given
below:
• Particle Diameter (PD): Dust particles have different shapes and sizes. In this
study, Particle median diameter is chosen as PD. The unit of the PD is micron,
µm.
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• Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC): If the dust particles are accumu-
lated in a certain volume then the concentration is a major factor in an explosion.
A dust cloud must have to maintain a minimum concentration below which it
will not be able to explode. MEC is measured in g/m3.
• Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE): The dust particle, if exposed to a suitable
condition which facilitates the explosion, must have a minimum ignition energy.
If the minimum ignition energy requirement is not met the explosion will not
take place. The unit of MIE is mJ.
• Minimum Ignition Temperature (MIT): The minimum temperature which is
required to initiate the ignition process is called minimum ignition temperature,
MIT. The unit used to measure MIT is ◦C.
• Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC): Limiting oxygen concentration is the
availability of the oxidant. The LOC is measured by volume % of O2 above
which deflagration can take place [NFPA, 2008].
• Maximum Explosion Pressure (Pmax): When the explosion takes place the pa-
rameter which measures the severity of the explosion is pressure. The unit of
measurement for maximum explosion pressure is bar(g).
2.5 Dust Explosion Prevention and Mitigation
When selecting dust explosion prevention and mitigation, it is very helpful to employ
a heuristic or framework for making appropriate choices [Amyotte et al., 2003]. The
fire triangle in Figure 2.1 and the explosion pentagon in Figure 2.2 offer guidance to
identify the explosion causation factors [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010]. For example,
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the triangle provides industrial practitioners several approaches to explosion preven-
tion (e.g., removal of fuel by good housekeeping and removal of ignition sources by
grounding). The use of the pentagon may help to visualize explosion requirements
leads to identification of measures for explosion mitigation such as venting (in relief of
the confinement criterion) [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010]. For further development of
preventive and mitigatory methods, fundamental aspects in dust explosion research
needs to focus on dust cloud formation, dust cloud ignition process, flame propaga-
tion process in dust clouds and blast wave generated by burning dust clouds [Eckhoff,
2005]. Some of widely used prevention and mitigation process are described below:
2.5.1 Explosion Venting
Explosion venting is one of the most widely used methods of mitigating dust explo-
sion. The vital point of venting is area sizing [Eckhoff, 2005]. Tamanini and Valiulis
[Tamanini and Valiulis, 1996] illustrated an improved model for sizing vents for the
protection of equipment and buildings from dust explosions, rely on statistical regres-
sions of test data. An effort based on this approach produced notable improvements in
several aspects of explosion vent sizing, including: vent duct and panel inertia effects,
partial volume deflagrations, venting of equipment inside buildings, and explosions at
initial elevated pressure etc. A similar approach was discussed by Ural [Ural, 2001].
Different formulae have been used to size the explosion vents for strong and weak
enclosure. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 68 Committee has de-
veloped a simplified equation for strong and weak structures that may be subjected
to full volume or partial volume internal explosions. Ural [Ural, 2001] proposed the
simplified analysis which was used to develop the unified formula.
Venting provides a smooth way of emission of blast waves and flames to the sur-
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roundings which may present hazard. several works has been developed to eliminate
hazards from the vent opening. Harmanny [Harmanny, 2001], Holbrow, Hawksworth
and Tyldesley [Holbrow et al., 2000] reported various aspects of blast wave magni-
tude, vent sizing and hazards on surroundings. Li, Deng and Liu [Li et al., 1994]
discussed about the quenching vending door (QVD) for dust and flame free venting.
To predict the resultant reacting impulse on a process structure during vented explo-
sion, Tamanini and Valiulis [Tamanini and Valiulis, 2000], Ural [Ural, 1993] presented
a novel approach. It was a conceptual formulation of theoretical approach. Lunn
[Lunn, 2001] studied some experiments on the impact of vent ducts at maximum ex-
plosion pressure during vented explosion. Crowhurst [Crowhurst, 1993] presented a
conclusive summary on the special consideration for industrial buildings and venting
arrangements for rooms/buildings > 5000 m3 with walls which is able to withstand
overpressure 0.2 bar. Tamanini [Tamanini, 2002] addresses two directions in which
design methods can evolve to yield more advanced predictive tools for engineering
applications. First, making use of simple models to identify parameters that better
capture the features of the available data. Adopting this feature, modelling can also
be used in a predictive mode. Second, the development and eventual adoption of more
advanced techniques, to address aspects of explosion problems that are currently well
beyond the capabilities of available methods. This last step will be necessary for the
technology to model diverse explosion scenario [Tamanini, 2002].
2.5.2 Explosion Isolation
The objective of explosion isolation is to prevent spreading of dust explosions from
the primary explosion location to other process units. Two approaches are widely
adopted for isolation: using quick acting shut-off valves and material chokes [Abbasi
and Abbasi, 2007].
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Wingerden, Pedersen, Teigland and Eckhoff [Van Wingerden et al., 1995] worked
experimentally on vented vessels interconnected via duct. To prevent dust explosion
spreading from one portion to another, several methods of explosion isolations can be
used. For example, fast-acting mechanical valves, rotary locks and diverters. Adoption
of such process will make the system more safer and reliable. Holbrow, Andrews and
Lunn [Holbrow et al., 1996] and Holbrow, Lunn and Tyldesley [Holbrow et al., 1999]
recapitulated the outcomes of similar experiments in UK and described quantitative
guidance during designing phase of interconnected process equipments.
2.5.3 Automatic Explosion Suppression (AES)
A system which gets activated as soon as the the explosion begin to take place,
suppresses the the explosion by immediately adding inertants, and prevents it from
rebuilding, is known as automatic explosion suppression system (AES). AES device
aims to achieve four basic attributes [Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007]:
• Responds within minimum time delay with activation
• Adequate suppressant injection within short time to arrest the flame propagation
• To shut down the plant
• Prevent the plant getting restarted until complete explosion hazard mitigation
Moore [Moore, 1996], Chatrathi and Going [Chatrathi and Going, 1998] discussed
about the suitable suppressant selection. Moore and Siwek [Moore and Siwek, 1998]
recapitulate the extensive experimental work and provided significant modification
on suppressant system. Chatrathi and Going [Chatrathi and Going, 2000] provided a
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comprehensive overview of recent technology and suggestion for implementing auto-
matic suppression system in industrial aspect.
In contrary, this method of dust explosion mitigation is comparatively complex and
costly to adopt, therefore, used when less expensive methods are not adequate [Eck-
hoff, 2005].
2.5.4 Inerting
Intering is comparatively a new but promising concept of dust explosion mitigation
process. With the reduction of oxygen, both ignition sensitivity and combustion rate
of the dust cloud decreases. This concept is applied for the inerting process. A mod-
erate reduction in oxygen concentration can significantly reduce the explosion hazard
[Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010]. A modest reduction of oxygen can significantly increase
the minimum ignition energy. In gaseous phase (mixture of nitrogen and oxygen)
maximum rate of pressure rise (Kst) exhibits a liner relation with the percentage of
oxygen concentration [Devlikanov et al., 1995]. Eckhoff [Eckhoff, 2004] proposed for
extensive use of partial inerting as it a cost effective and efficient way of mitigating
dust explosion.
2.5.5 Process Equipment Design
Design of process equipment for specific internal explosion load can significantly
change the safety standard of the plant. Harmanny’s [Harmanny, 1993] study deliv-
ers the insight to predict the response of the enclosure structure to the explosion load.
The limitation of the study was revisited by Harmanny [Harmanny, 1996, Harmanny,
1999] and it provides a conclusion that, the concept of pressure-shock-resistant design
14
should be developed further to facilitate cost effective equipment design. Li, Chen,
Deng and Eckhoff [Li et al., 2002] compared the elastic and plastic structural response
of a simple mechanical structure determined experimentally with prediction from
using a computational finite-element based approach.
15
Chapter 3
A Model to Assess Dust Explosion
Occurrence Probability
Junaid Hassana, Faisal Khana, Paul Amyotteb, Refaul Ferdousa
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Canada, A1B 3X5
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Preface
A version of this manuscript is accepted in the Journal of Hazardous Materials, Jan-
uary 2014 (Reference No: HAZMAT-D-13-03942R1). The co-authors, Dr. Khan,
Amyotte and Refaul supervised the principle author, Junaid, to develop the research
on the entitled topic and helped him to conceptualize the techniques and theories
available for this topic. Junaid conducted the dust explosion prediction modelling
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and associated statistical tests and necessary analysis while Dr. Khan, Amyotte and
Refaul reviewed the manuscript and provided necessary suggestions.
Abstract
Dust handling poses a potential explosion hazard in many industrial facilities. The
consequences of a dust explosion are often severe and similar to a gas explosion; how-
ever, its occurrence is conditional to the presence of five elements: combustible dust,
ignition source, oxidant, mixing and confinement. Experiments have been conducted
by dust explosion researchers to study the characteristics of these elements and gener-
ate data for explosibility. These experiments are often costly but the generated data
has a significant scope in estimating the probability of a dust explosion occurrence.
This paper attempts to use existing information (experimental data) to develop a
predictive model to assess the probability of a dust explosion occurrence in a given
environment. The proposed model considers six key parameters of a dust explosion:
Dust Particle Diameter (PD), Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE), Minimum Explosi-
ble Concentration (MEC ), Minimum Ignition Temperature (MIT ), Limiting Oxygen
Concentration (LOC ) and Explosion Pressure (Pmax). A conditional probabilistic ap-
proach has been developed and embedded in the proposed model to generate a nomo-
graph for assessing dust explosion occurrence. The generated nomograph provides a
quick assessment technique to map the occurrence probability of a dust explosion for
a given environment defined with the six parameters.
Keywords: Probabilistic approach, Probability distribution, Dust explosion, Dust
explosion parameters, Nomograph.
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Dust explosion
Dust explosions pose a serious hazard in dust processing facilities. According to the
definition of BS2955 [BS1, 1958, Lees and Mannan, 2005], particles with a diameter
of less than 1000 µm are defined as powder and when particles have a diameter less
than 76 µm (200BS mesh size) they are referred to as ‘dust’. As per NFPA (National
Fire Protection Association), ‘dust’ is any finely divided solid, 420 µm or less in di-
ameter. Though BS:2955 [BS1, 1958, Lees and Mannan, 2005] and NFPA 68 have
different definitions for defining dust, Palmer [Palmer, 1973] proposed that a particle
with a diameter coarser than 1000 µm should be called dust [Lees and Mannan, 2005].
The term dust used as per the NFPA 68 [NFPA, 2007] definition, which is consid-
ered potentially threatening for the process industries. As the range of the explosible
particle size may be larger for a specific material, the particle size distribution is
considered in addition to the median particle diameter [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010].
In this study, combustible dust is the primary focus. Any particular material capa-
ble of exploding when suspended in air in ignitable concentrations, regardless of size,
shape or chemical composition termed combustible dust [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010].
Dust explosion scenarios are not only restricted to coal mines or food industries; they
may occur at a chemical process plant, in the wood and paper industry, in metal
handling units, etc. Most dust handling plants are susceptible to dust explosions and
thus require special safety measures and monitoring aids.
Combustible dust needs to achieve certain criteria to explode. Five factors are iden-
tified as triggers responsible for a dust explosion : particle diameter, minimum ex-
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plosible concentration, minimum ignition energy, minimum ignition temperature and
limiting oxygen concentration. To cause an explosion, five criteria ( fuel, oxidant,
ignition source, mixing and confinement) need to be fulfilled. The five identified pa-
rameters cover the five essential elements of a dust explosion. A dust explosion is a
rapid combustion of flammable dust particles in an environment that supports the
initiation of the combustion.
A dust explosion is initiated when suspended flammable particles in the air are in
close proximity with a proper ignition source. If the dust cloud is unconfined and the
ignition source is present, it would typically produce a flash fire. For rapid and violent
combustion, confinement is a necessary element. Likewise, four other conditions are
also very important for an explosion to occur. According to Kauffman [Kauffman,
1982] a dust explosion will occur when the explosion pentagon is completed. This
pentagon consists of mixing, confinement, fuel, oxidant and an ignition source. When
these parameters reach a sufficient threshold limit (explosible range), a dust explo-
sion occurs [Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007]. In addition, an explosion may not occur if all
parameters do not reach the explosible range [NFPA, 2007].
In this study, a conceptual framework for a dust explosion prediction model is pro-
posed which considers a process plants operating conditions and provides a quick
estimate of dust explosion occurrence. For the development of the model, six basic
parameters are identified that are necessary to describe dust explosion phenomena in
a conditional probabilistic way. These parameters are analysed thoroughly to under-
stand their pattern. The parameters have a wide range of numerical values so their
inherent distributions are identified. The distribution highlights the characteristics
of the parameter and also imparts knowledge on the variety of the data. These dis-
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tributions are used to develop the dust explosion prediction model. To assess the
conditional probability, two parameters at a time have been considered to estimate
the probability of explosion occurrence for a given scenario. Estimating the condi-
tional probability for each parameter and integrating them over a range provides the
total probability of dust explosion occurrence. The systematic approach provides a
simple guideline which can be used in monitoring process facility conditions. A sim-
plified "nomograph" is introduced to make the model easier and more user-friendly.
A nomograph is a very useful tool for understanding the operating conditions of a
process plant in terms of the probability of a dust explosion.
In this paper, an overview of the methodology and a brief description of the proposed
model are provided in sections 4.2 and 4.3. The application of the proposed model
in the industry is described in section 3.4. Section 3.5 is devoted to discussion and
section 3.6 gives the conclusions, which include recommendations for future work.
3.1.2 Mechanism and causes
A dust explosion is a rapid and simultaneous combustion of flammable suspended
particles [Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007]. Its strength is dependent on flame speed and
the degree of confinement of the particles [Eckhoff, 2003]. As mentioned earlier, five
basic parameters are responsible for dust explosion occurrence. The outcome of the
dust explosion is measured in terms of severity. In the study, the maximum explosion
pressure is the indicator of the severity, as it is the most widely used indicator of the
explosion scenario for a particular dust. A brief description of these six parameters is
given below:
• Particle Diameter (PD): Dust particles have different shapes and sizes.In this
study, the particle median diameter is chosen as PD and only micron-sized dusts
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are considered. Median diameter may be different if it is on a mass basis or a
volume basis. However, for most dusts particles of interest, it is assumed that
density remains constant throughout the entire particle size distribution. Thus
mass basis analysis can be treated similar as volume basis. The unit of the PD
is µm.
• Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC): If the dust particles are accumu-
lated in a certain volume then the concentration is a major factor in an explosion.
A dust cloud must maintain a minimum concentration below which it will not
be able to explode. MEC is measured in g/m3.
• Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE): If the minimum ignition energy requirement
is not met the explosion will not take place. The unit of MIE is mJ.
• Minimum Ignition Temperature (MIT): The minimum temperature which is
required to initiate the ignition process is called the minimum ignition temper-
ature, MIT. The unit used to measure MIT is ◦C.
• Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC): Limiting oxygen concentration is the
availability of the oxidant. The LOC is measured by volume % of O2 above
which a deflagration can take place [NFPA, 2008].
• Maximum Explosion Pressure (Pmax): When an explosion takes place the pa-
rameter which measures the severity of the explosion is pressure. The unit of
measurement for maximum explosion pressure is bar(g).
For a given dust material, Pmax increases with a decrease in PD. Usually, MIE de-
creases with a decrease of PD and a decrease of PD can also lower MEC and MIT
[Eckhoff, 2003]. Dust particles vary considerably from industry to industry, based on
their chemical composition, which includes food, wood, coal, pharmaceuticals, plastic,
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metal and paper. However, in this study, the chemical composition is not considered.
Therefore, the developed model to assess the probability of dust explosion is a generic
model irrespective of dust type. All dusts are not likely to be explosible. The finer the
particle size the lesser the requirement for MIE, which allows the dust particles to burn
easily. Once they are in contact with air and fuel in a confined space, this can produce
an explosion. Sometimes partial confinement can cause an explosion which is similar
to a flammable gas [Proust, 2006]. Industrial process plants are dependent mostly on
’scaling up’ to enhance their production and most of them are huge, complex facilities
which are also associated with greater risk of human injury, environmental damage
and economic loss [Khan and Amyotte, 2004, Khan et al., 2002].
A dust explosion may follow a domino effect: a primary explosion followed by a
secondary one. Most of the safety hazard mitigation processes try to eliminate the
possibility of an explosion by imposing a layer of protection to prevent the simultane-
ous deterioration of the safety barrier. Once the secondary explosion begins it might
take on a more violent form causing a great amount of loss [Pickup, 2001].
3.1.3 Current status of dust explosion research
Dust explosion hazards are a continuous threat to process facilities that deal with pow-
ders or combustible materials. Research on safer plant design, safer work places and
several standard safety codes is available in contemporary literature and books [Amy-
otte et al., 2009, Amyotte et al., 2003, Khan and Amyotte, 2003, Eckhoff, 2003, Eck-
hoff, 2005].
Amyotte et al. [Amyotte et al., 2003] proposed inherent safety as a proactive approach
for hazard and risk mitigation during the design and operation phase. The proposed
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methodology discusses safer process implementation, considering inherent safety in
the reduction of hazards at the very first instance in the workplace. Their conceptual
framework mainly discusses minimizing, substituting, moderating and simplifying the
process plant to eradicate the possibilities of hazards to improve safety and protection
[Khan and Amyotte, 2003].
The framework proposed by Amyotte et al. [Amyotte and Khan, 2002] incorporates
the principle of inherent safety, which is actually aimed at first reducing or completely
removing the hazard, followed by addressing the frequency of occurrence and the sub-
sequent severity component of risk.
Eckhoff [Eckhoff, 2005] analysed a comprehensive compendium of the current status
and expected future of dust explosion research. He discussed various existing safety
precautionary measures used or under consideration. Flame propagation reduction,
preventing explosive dust clouds and ignition sources were elaborately analysed. More-
over, explosion isolation, automatic explosion suppression and explosion venting were
discussed throughout his study.
A number of safety codes are available that help to protect the industry from dust
explosions. The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) provides a number of
codes (e.g. NFPA 68, 69, 650, 654) to prevent and mitigate dust explosions [Abbasi
and Abbasi, 2007].
3.1.4 Probabilistic measure for dust explosion
The aforementioned safety standards are widely followed by industry. Different safety
methods have been proposed and analysed with case studies to make process plants
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safer. Still, dust explosion is an alarming issue for industries which are dealing con-
tinuously with dust materials.
Research has been done and is still ongoing on the prevention system, inherently safer
design and protective or mitigatory measures. To maintain a high level of safety, pro-
cess industries are trying to provide more safety training and education. Hence, it
is very important to analyse the process parameters and to understand the proba-
bility of dust explosion occurrence in a specific scenario. Dust explosion researchers
have contributed significantly to dust explosion parameters and their characteristics.
This existing knowledge can be effectively utilized in probabilistic approaches to get
a predictive model. A vast amount of data has never been analysed to understand
the distribution of the dust explosion parameters. These distributions are used in the
probabilistic model to adopt a better and safer process facility.
The risk assessment involves two quantitative terms: the probability of an occur-
rence and the consequence. Significant research has been done on the latter part.
While considering risk assessment the probability of the explosion is either chosen
or derived from the frequencies of dust explosion [Voort et al., 2007]. In this paper,
a newly developed model is introduced to estimate the probability of a dust explosion.
The model considers six parameters. These parameters are divided into two major
divisions: the influencing parameter and the severity parameter. Five influencing pa-
rameters are mentioned earlier and one parameter is taken as a severity parameter to
determine the conditional probability of a dust explosion. Five conditional probabil-
ities are combined to estimate the total probability of dust explosion occurrence. A
probabilistic model for assessing and quantifying the probability of a dust explosion
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occurrence is the novelty of this paper. A conditional probabilistic way to determine
the probability, and developing the nomograph is the main focus of this paper.
3.2 Methodology for dust explosion probability as-
sessment
The proposed methodology to assess dust explosion likelihood is comprised of five
steps. These steps are subdivided into several sub-steps. Figure 4.1 represents the
framework of the proposed methodology. Details are given below:
1. Hazard identification,
2. Data collection,
3. Data analysis,
4. Probabilistic modelling and
5. Nomograph development
3.2.1 Step 1 : Hazard identification
Hazard identification is the first step of the methodology. The possible hazards for a
dust explosion are identified in this step. The list of possible hazards is considered and
the elements with the most potential for contributing to the hazards are determined.
For example, a dust explosion occurs when the process parameters are not in the safe
operating region. Dust explosion parameters are monitored and compared with the
limiting state (regulatory standard or operating limit). If the parameter exceeds the
limiting state, it is considered as a potential hazard for the process facility. All the
potential hazards are identified and listed in this step.
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Figure 3.1: A framework for assessing dust explosion occurrence
3.2.2 Step 2 : Data collection
Collecting available data is the focus of this step. After identifying possible hazards,
relevant parameters are searched individually for the available data. These data may
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be collected either from experimental work, standard literature or pertinent databases.
If sufficient data are available, the process proceeds to the next step. Otherwise, an
engineering judgement is made with regard to the missing data. In this study, Rolf
Echkoff’s book (Appendix: Table: A1 in reference [Eckhoff, 2003] and NFPA 69
standard (Table C.1(b) in reference [NFPA, 2008] are used for collecting data. To
obtain a generic model the considered data contains dust particle of food feed; metal
alloys; plastic, resin and rubber; coal products and pharmaceuticals.
3.2.3 Step 3 : Data analysis
In this step, the underlying distribution for six parameters is determined from the
collected data and the probability density functions (PDFs) are also defined. This
step involves three sub-steps which are discussed below:
3.2.3.1 Parameter classification
The potential hazard and associated parameters identified in step 1 are classified in
two different groups: dust explosion influencing parameters and severity parameters.
Particle Diameter (PD), Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC), Minimum Ig-
nition Temperature (MIT), Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) and Limiting Oxygen
Concentration (LOC) are considered as dust explosion influencing parameters. The
Maximum Explosion Pressure, Pmax is considered as the dust explosion severity pa-
rameter.
3.2.3.2 Statistical analysis
In this sub-step, the obtained data is analysed statistically to determine distribu-
tion. For each parameter, the collected data is analysed through different statistical
tests such as non-parametric goodness of fit tests; e.g. the Anderson Darling (AD)
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and Kolmogorov Smirnov (KS) test. The analysis helps to determine the best fitted
distribution for each parameter.
3.2.3.3 PDFs determination
In this sub-step, the mathematical functions for good-fit-distributions for each pa-
rameter are determined using the supportive statistical tools of Minitab and Matlab.
3.2.4 Step 4 : Probabilistic modelling
The results from step 2 and the obtained distributions and mathematical functions
from step 3 are successively used in modelling the dust explosion likelihood for a given
condition. Step 4 is comprised of three sub-steps as discussed below:
3.2.4.1 Joint probability distribution determination and integral limit
specification
For the conditional probability estimation, the joint probability distribution must be
determined. Once the distributions are defined the next step is to form a joint proba-
bility distribution. To determine a joint probability distribution, correlation between
the distributions needs to be defined. To determine the joint probability equation,
a single parameter is always considered from influencing parameters along with the
severity parameter, and the remaining parameters are kept constant.
One of the most challenging parts of the methodology is to correlate two distributions
with a single parameter. To solve this problem, the correlation between the parameters
is defined by using a copula function. Integral limits are developed by analysing the
available data. The upper and lower bounds of the integrals of the joint probability
equations are replaced accordingly, with the lower and higher values of the data. The
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same procedure is repeated for the other influencing parameters. The final outcome of
this section is the joint probability distribution equation for all potential parameters,
correlating the severity parameter and influencing parameters.
3.2.4.2 Conditional probability assessment
This sub-step’s aim is to quantify the conditional probability of the dust explosion.
The joint probability equations are solved to obtain the quantitative estimate of the
conditional probability. A software, Maple is used to solve the complex integrals of
joint probability functions. The conditional probability evaluates the likelihood of the
dust explosion for a given parameter with a specific range. Again, the solution of the
complex integral of joint probability function is obtained by considering one parameter
at a time. The adoption of the discussed procedure enables the quantification of the
likelihood of dust explosion for a given range of any parameter which has been earlier
identified and analysed in steps 1, 2 and 3.
3.2.4.3 Total probability estimation
The final sub-step of the probabilistic modelling [3.2.4] is to determine the total
probability of a dust explosion and to develop the nomograph. The results obtained
from the sub-steps [3.2.4.2] for different parameters are combined to assess the total
probability. This helps to estimate the total probability of a dust explosion for a given
condition of operating parameters.
3.2.5 Step 5 : Nomograph development
The final step of the methodology is to develop a nomograph. A nomograph is devel-
oped to provide a quick estimation and a visual representation of the dust explosion
probability. A dust explosion pentagon is used for depicting the vulnerable region
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and visualizing the area under the pentagon to represent the total probability of dust
explosion. The nomograph is a simpler way to study the impact of the operating
conditions in terms of probability of exceedance.
3.3 Model for dust explosion prediction
The proposed methodology employs the rules of conditional probability to determine
the total probability of a dust explosion. Conditional probability defines the proba-
bility of a specific event with given conditions. For instance, consider A and B as two
dependent events. The conditional probability of an event B in relationship to event
A is the probability that event B occurs given that event A has already occurred. The
concept is identical if event B happens prior to event A.
General equation for conditional probability rules:
P (A ∩B) = P (A) ∗ P (B/A)
= P (B) ∗ P (A/B)
or, P (B/A) = P (A∩B)
P (A)
=
∫
A
∫
B
(Joint function of AandB) dB dA∫
A
(function of A) dA
or, P (A/B) = P (B∩A)
P (B)
=
∫
A
∫
B
(Joint function of AandB) dB dA∫
B
(function of B) dB
(3.1)
The conditional probability rules can be applied for the dust explosion phenomenon
considering its occurrence as a consequence of influencing parameters. For any influ-
encing parameter there is a threshold value up to which the dust explosion will not
be triggered. Therefore, the dust explosion is a conditioned event, depending on the
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transcendence of the limiting value of influencing parameters. To model dust explo-
sion probability, one influencing parameter is considered at a time. To determine a
conditional probability equation two dust explosion variables are used. One variable
is considered from the dust explosion influencing parameters and the other one is
Pmax, as a severity parameter. The joint probability equation can be determined by
using these two parameters.
The joint probability equation for particle diameter and dust explosion pressure is:
P (Pmax/PD) =
∫ Pmaxcriticalmax
Pmaxcriticalmin
∫ PDcriticalmax
PDcriticalmin
P (Pmax ∩ PD) dPDdPmax∫ PDmax
PDmin
PDdPD
(3.2)
Joint probability equation for MEC and dust explosion pressure is:
P (Pmax/MEC) =
∫ Pmaxcriticalmax
Pmaxcriticalmin
∫MECcriticalmax
MECcriticalmin
P (Pmax ∩MEC) dMECdPmax∫MECmax
MECmin
MEC dMEC
(3.3)
Joint probability equation for MIT and dust explosion pressure is:
P (Pmax/MIT ) =
∫ Pmaxcriticalmax
Pmaxcriticalmin
∫MITcriticalmax
MITcriticalmin
P (Pmax ∩MIT ) dMITdPmax∫MITmax
MITmin
MIT dMIT
(3.4)
Joint probability equation for MIE and dust explosion pressure is:
P (Pmax/MIE) =
∫ Pmaxcriticalmax
Pmaxcriticalmin
∫MIEcriticalmax
MIEcriticalmin
P (Pmax ∩MIE) dMIEdPmax∫MIEmax
MIEmin
MIE dMIE
(3.5)
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Joint probability equation for LOC and dust explosion pressure is:
P (Pmax/LOC) =
∫ Pmaxcriticalmax
Pmaxcriticalmin
∫ LOCcriticalmax
LOCcriticalmin
P (Pmax ∩ LOC) dLOCdPmax∫ LOCmax
LOCmin
LOC dLOC
(3.6)
Five influencing parameters in terms of severity parameters are expressed by the joint
probability equation (from Equation 3.2 to Equation 3.6). In these equations, two
different kinds of integral notation are used; e.g. PD has two different ranges. From
the pool of extracted data from the source, the lower and upper limits are denoted by
PDmin and PDmax. From the extracted data, a 95% data range is considered as the
critical limit. The lower and higher range of the critical limit is denoted by PDcriticalmin
and PDcriticalmax . The functional relationship between the influencing parameters and
severity parameter is established by the joint probability equations.
While determining the conditional probability for each parameter with respect to
Pmax as the severity parameter, two different sets of integral limits on the numerator
and denominator part of the equation are considered. On the numerator part, the
double integral of the joint function measures the most vulnerable region for both
the influencing parameter and the severity parameter. On the denominator part, the
integral of the parameter evaluates the probability of obtaining the parameter in a
vulnerable region. To solve the joint probability equation the specific distribution for
each of the parameters is required.
Four distributions : normal, lognormal, weibull and gamma were chosen for analysing
the goodness-of-fit test for the particle diameter (PD). The probability plot for the
particle diameter shows four different distributions as part of the analysis. In the
study, the level of significance, α=0.05 is used. It provides a 95% confidence level.
The probability plot (Figure 3.2) shows that the lognormal distribution provides the
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best fit for PD. Depending on the statistical analysis, given earlier in section 3.2.3, it
can be deduced that the best distribution for particle diameter is lognormal distribu-
tion. The distribution parameters are determined through detailed statistical analysis.
A similar goodness-of-fit test approach has been implemented for MEC, MIE, MIT
and LOC to determine the best fit distributions and to identify the distribution pa-
rameters. The details of each distribution are depicted in Table 4.1.
Table 3.1: Dust explosion parameter distribution identification
Dust explosion
parameters
Best fitted
distribution
Estimated distribution
parameter
95% Data
range
PD Lognormal λPD=4.02, ζPD=0.95513 25-400 µm
MEC Normal µMEC=80, σMEC=45 15-215 g/m3
MIT Normal µMIT=504, σMIT=65 400-700 ◦C
MIE Lognormal λMIE=4.71518, ζMIE=1.50173 10-700 mJ
LOC Normal µLOC=10.97, σLOC=2.12468 8.75-12 % O2
Pmax Weibull βPmax=8.89, θPmax=10.7 8-10.5 bar(g)
The estimated parameters of the identified distributions can be used in the mathemat-
Figure 3.2: The probability plot for particle diameter analysis
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ical formulation of the probability distribution function. Equations with parameters
to assist the analysis to determine the likelihood of the dust explosion phenomenon
are given as:
For PD:
fPD(PD;λPD, ζPD) =
1
PDζPD
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
ln(PD)−λPD
ζPD
)2 (3.7)
For MEC:
fMEC(MEC;µMEC , σMEC) =
1
σMEC
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
MEC−µMEC
σMEC
)2 (3.8)
For MIT:
fMIT (MIT ;µMIT , σMIT ) =
1
σMIT
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
MIT−µMIT
σMIT
)2 (3.9)
For MIE:
fMIE(MIE;λMIE, ζMIE) =
1
MIEζMIE
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
ln(MIE)−λMIE
ζMIE
)2 (3.10)
For LOC:
fLOC(LOC;µLOC , σLOC) =
1
σLOC
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
LOC−µLOC
σLOC
)2 (3.11)
For Pmax:
fPmax(Pmax; βPmax , θPmax) =
βPmax
θPmax
(Pmax
θPmax
)βPmax−1e−(
Pmax
θPmax
)βPmax (3.12)
Equations (3.2 to 3.6) correlate the dust explosion severity as a function of the in-
fluencing parameters. For example, consider the parameter PD for the explanation.
Data analysis for PD confirms the range of 25 µm to 400 µm covers the 95% of the
data which is the addressed critical zone at this analysis. The limits for the integral
reflect the vulnerable region where a dust explosion is likely. The vulnerable region is
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determined by assessing the data frequency in the specific range. The data used for
the analysis are arranged and analysed to understand the range. Data analysis for the
severity parameter Pmax confirms that most dust explosion pressure data are likely
to be within 8 to 10.4 bar(g) [Eckhoff, 2003]. For the calculation, the upper bound
is rounded up to 10.5 bar(g). Analysing the dust explosion phenomenon in terms of
Pmax and PD alone, the probability of having a dust explosion due to the PD range
susceptible to explosion may be written as Equation 4.7:
P (Pmax/PD) =
∫ Pmaxcriticalmax
Pmaxcriticalmin
∫ PDcriticalmax
PDcriticalmin
P (Pmax∩PD) dPDdPmax∫ PDmax
PDmin
PDdPD
=
∫ 400
25
∫ 10.5
8 P (Pmax∩PD) dPDdPmax∫ 420
1 PDdPD
=
∫ 400
25
∫ 10.5
8 C(fPD,fpmax )∗fPD(PD;λPD,ζPD)∗fPmax (Pmax;βPmax ,θPmax ) dPDdPmax∫ 420
1 fPD(PD;λPD,ζPD)dPD
(3.13)
All the parameters and their values are already known and the function for the PD
and Pmax are also determined from the distribution characteristic.
Copula function is used to quantify the dependence among variables. Copula can be
used for parametric, semi-parametric and non-parametric functions [Joe, 1997]. It
can model the non-linear dependencies between the parameters [Chen and Huang,
2007, Genest and Favre, 2007]. In our analysis, the copula function is introduced and
kept as unity, C(fPD,fPmax)=1. Two distributions are multiplied along with the cop-
ula function to represent the joint probability function. Further study is required to
establish the copula function for a specifically defined parameter relation. Interest in
copulas arises from several perspectives. The copula function is a very helpful method
for deriving joint distributions. Second, copulas can be used to define non-parametric
measures of dependence for pairs of random variables when a bivariate context is
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considered.
When the modes of dependence go beyond correlation or linear association, copula
function plays a significant role in establishing the relationship. Finally, copulas are
useful extensions and generalizations of approaches for modelling joint distributions
and dependence that have appeared in the literature [Trivedi and Zimmer, 2007].
For instance, PD and Pmax distributions are multiplied with the integral limit as their
coexistence is responsible for the explosion occurrence. Once Equation 4.7 is solved
for a particular PD limit within operational range it will show the estimated proba-
bility of the dust explosion for the specific PD range. The value for the upper and
lower limits can be varied as users define bounds within the operational range. This
provides the model with a suitable degree of flexibility to obtain a posterior proba-
bility of dust explosion. The above equation (Equation 4.7) is solved for the entire
range of the vulnerability. The vulnerable region here is defined as the region of the
data most likely to cause an explosion. The range is chosen by screening the data
collected from Echkoff’s book (Appendix: Table: A1 in reference [Eckhoff, 2003]) for
all the parameters except LOC. LOC data were excerpted from the NFPA 69 (Table
C.1(b) in reference [NFPA, 2008]).
Once the complex integral is solved it quantifies the posterior probability of dust ex-
plosion for the given integral limit. The complete range of probability with respect
to the PD variation is plotted as probability density function. This provides an ex-
cellent opportunity to determine the probability of explosion for a specific range of PD.
The above process is repeated for the other parameters (MEC, MIT, MIE and LOC)
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with respect to the severity parameter, Pmax. The posterior probability density
function is eventually transformed into the CDF to read the posterior conditional
probability, according to the specific range. For a given scenario, if the limits of op-
erational condition are known for PD, the conditional probability can be read from
Figure 3.4(a). For instance, if a process plant handles dust particle ranges between
36 µm to 410 µm, the conditional probability can be read from Figure 3.4(a) which
gives a probability value of 0.336 (From Figure 3.4(a), for 410 µm the conditional
probability value read is 0.4 and for 36 µm the conditional probability value is 0.064.
subtracting these two gives 0.336 as the conditional probability value for PD. Statisti-
cally, the value is the area under the curve in Figure 3.3(a) for the PD ranges between
36 µm to 410 µm). This helps to identify the critical upper limit zone of operation.
The above process is repeated for the other parameters (MEC, MIT, MIE and LOC)
with respect to the severity parameter, Pmax. The posterior probability density func-
tion is eventually transformed into the CDF to read the posterior conditional proba-
bility, according to the specific range. This helps to identify the critical upper limit
zone of operation.
Figure 3.3 shows the probability density plot of dust explosion for specific conditions.
It depicts the change of probability value with respect to the parameter value. Figure
4.2 is a cumulative density function graph which shows the entire probability covered
for the given parameter range. It is used in determining the posterior probability of
explosion up to a certain range.
The PDF plot (Figure 3.3) for PD shows the trend of probability value change with
respect to the change of particle diameter. As the particle diameter increases, the pos-
terior probability of dust explosion decreases. The probability of explosion is higher
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in the PD zone of 25-100 µm than the zone above 100 µm (Figure 3.3(a)). Figure
3.3(a) shows that the chance of having an explosion is less than 0.001 if the PD is
more than 150 µm. This suggests that bigger PD poses less chance of explosion. It
also provides significant insight regarding the operating limit of the particle diameter.
The PDF plot for MEC, Figure 3.3(b) shows the trend of increasing MEC value and
(a) Probability density plot for PD (b) Probability density plot for MEC
(c) Probability density plot for MIE (d) Probability density plot for MIT
(e) Probability density plot for LOC
Figure 3.3: Probability density plot at a given condition for all the parameters.
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its effect on the probability of a dust explosion. The probability of an explosion in-
creases from 15-80 g/m3 and then it descends. The probability of a dust explosion
reduces to below 0.1% after 160 g/m3.
The PDF plot for MIE, Figure 3.3(c) shows that the probability of dust explosion
decreases when the MIE value increases. This plot shows that the zone of 20-100 mJ
(a) Posterior probability for PD (b) Posterior probability for MEC
(c) Posterior probability for MIE (d) Posterior probability for MIT
(e) Posterior probability for LOC
Figure 3.4: Posterior probability plot at a given condition for all the parameters.
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poses much higher dust explosion probability than the following zone. The probability
of a dust explosion becomes less (less than 0.05%) when the upper range exceeds 240
mJ.
The PDF plot for MIT, Figure 3.3(d) shows the variation of dust explosion probability
with the increase of MIT value. It shows the probability of dust explosion increases
with the increase of MIT value and this trend is valid up to 500 ◦C. Above 500 ◦C,
the dust explosion probability reduces and drops to 0.05% when the MIT values are
above 620 ◦C.
The PDF plot for LOC, Figure 3.3(e) shows the change of dust explosion probability
with respect to the change of oxygen concentration. NFPA 69 regulation states that :
LOC value usually varies from 7(% of O2) to 15(% of O2) in different process facilities
[NFPA, 2008]. Figure 3.3(e) depicts a significant rise of dust explosion probability
for the LOC value of 8.75(% of O2) to 10.75(% of O2). After that, it decreases up
to 12(% of O2). The top probability is found to be 0.024 for the LOC of 10.75 (%
of O2). According to NFPA 69: The most vulnerable region which facilitates dust
explosion is most often 9(% of O2) to 12(% of O2). Therefore, in this study the range
is considered constant from 7-8.75 (% of O2) and 12-15 (% of O2).
3.4 Applicability of the developed probabilistic model
The model discussed earlier is a systematic approach to determine the probability
of a dust explosion for a given range of operating parameters in the process facility.
This is a generic model which considers dust particles regardless of their chemical
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composition and is a handy tool to monitor the plant condition with respect to the
likelihood of dust explosion. To avoid the complexity of the mathematical procedure,
a simplified nomograph is developed. The process parameters are monitored and the
data are used in calculating the dust explosion probability.
The model enables using the upper and lower limits of the observed parameter as the
range of operation. It can also calculate the probability of dust explosion if only the
upper bound of the process parameter is provided. These features make the model
very flexible and user friendly. For instance, consider the following monitored data
at a specific time in a process facility. The following process condition is chosen to
demonstrate the applicability of the model.
• PD varies from 36 µm to 410 µm
• MEC varies within 26 g/m3 to 202 g/m3
• Upper limit for MIT is 600 ◦C
• Upper limit of MIE is 550 mJ
• Upper limit for LOC is 10.75 (% of O2)
The observed data or data range is used to calculate the dust explosion probability.
The conditional probabilities for five different parameters are calculated in the first
step. The total probability is then calculated considering five conditional probabilities.
All the information is depicted in the nomograph, which represents the conditional
probability and total probability of dust explosion, and makes the model easier to
interpret.
The nomograph in Figure 3.5 describes the conditional probability in five vertices and
the total probability is a combination of these conditional probabilities. In Table 2,
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Figure 3.5: Nomograph for dust explosion
the far left column indicates the parameters and their operational range. Two middle
columns show the upper and lower bounds of the observed process parameters. The
far right column provides the calculated conditional probability for each parameter
and the total probability as well.
Table 3.2: Nomograph calculation interface
Influencing Parameters Lower bound Upper bound Conditional probability
PD (25-400) 36 410 0.336 (PPD)
MEC (15-215) 26 202 0.483 (PMEC)
MIT (400-700) 400 600 0.453 (PMIT )
MIE (10-700) 10 550 0.429 (PMIE)
LOC (7-15) 7 10.75 0.128 (PLOC)
Total probability of dust explosion 0.135 (PTotal)
The development mechanism of the nomograph includes three important steps. The
first step is gathering the data for each parameter. The upper and lower bounds of
each parameter are provided in this step. In the absence of a lower bound, the upper
bound can be used in this model. The second step is calculating the conditional
probability by using the method described earlier. The final step of the nomograph
development is calculating the total probability of explosion. This is the most intricate
step, and it involves a governing equation:
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PTotal = 12 ∗ [(PPD ∗ PMEC) + (PMEC ∗ PMIT ) + (PMIT ∗ PMIE)+
(PMIE ∗ PLOC) + (PLOC ∗ PPD)] ∗ sin 72 ∗ Sf ∗Nf
(3.14)
For the given scenario, the total probability can be assessed by using the Equation
3.14. A scaling factor, Sf=0.684 and normalizing factor, Nf= 11.04976 are multiplied
with the Equation 3.14. These factors are included to fix the impact of tailoring the
decimal point of probability values. Table 4.2 provides the conditional probability
values which have already been calculated. In the above condition the PTotal is cal-
culated as :
PTotal = 12 ∗ [(0.336 ∗ 0.483) + (0.483 ∗ 0.453) + (0.453 ∗ 0.429)+
(0.429 ∗ 0.128) + (0.128 ∗ 0.336)] ∗ sin 72 ∗ Sf ∗Nf
= 12 ∗ [(0.336 ∗ 0.483) + (0.483 ∗ 0.453) + (0.453 ∗ 0.429)+
(0.429 ∗ 0.128) + (0.128 ∗ 0.336)] ∗ 0.951 ∗ 0.684 ∗ 11.04976
= 0.135
(3.15)
The calculation depicted above indicates that the occurrence probability of dust explo-
sion is 0.135 for the given conditions of the process facility. The nomograph indicates
the probability of 0.135 inside the pentagon with the shaded portion (Figure 3.5).
A regular pentagon depicts total probability of dust explosion considering five param-
eters exceeding the threshold limit. Each parameter follows a probability distribution,
so the exceedance of a particular value can be determined from the probability dis-
tribution. The same procedure is applied for the rest of the parameters, and while
they are all present in a specific facility, at a specific time, the nomograph represents
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the total probability of a dust explosion. It includes a mechanism to aggregate all the
conditional probabilities into the total probability of a dust explosion. It accounts for
all the parameters responsible for dust explosion.
The nomograph (Figure 3.5) is an easy method for the pictorial depiction of dust
explosion probability. The data handling and processing is made simple for the user
so that it would take little effort to use the method. In addition, the nomograph
is made easier to interpret. It is user-oriented and requires less effort and time to
compute the complex calculation. Moreover, the model is very flexible and can be
used for any dust handling facility.
3.5 Discussion
This paper discusses a newly proposed probabilistic model to estimate dust explosion
probability and demonstrate its application to different processing facilities.
The paper consists of three important parts. The first part is data monitoring. In an
industry, the potential dust explosion hazard causing parameters are: Particle Diam-
eter (PD), Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC), Minimum Ignition Temper-
ature (MIT), Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE) and Limiting Oxygen Concentration
(LOC). MIT and MIE are material parameters and these values are chosen for the
specific material. Other parameters (e.g. PD, MEC and LOC) are monitored and the
readings are used in the predictive model.
Once the data is obtained, the second part is the analysis and estimation of the prob-
ability of a dust explosion. For each parameter individual conditional probability is
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assessed and then the total probability of a dust explosion is calculated. The total
probability takes all the conditional probabilities into consideration which reflects the
plant operating conditions, in terms of probability of explosion.
The last part of the paper provides the nomograph for a quicker assessment of dust
explosion occurrence. This is a simple pictorial representation of the plant operating
condition in terms of probability of explosion. The nomograph shows the conditional
probability for each parameter and also the total probability in a closed region. The
area covered by the closed region inside the nomograph depicts the total probability
of dust explosion.
The proposed model is very convenient and effective in the following ways:
• Easier and faster implementation: The model consists of systematic structured
steps and requires very simple techniques to follow. Moreover, the software
aided steps reduce the data processing and modelling time significantly.
• Easy to interpret: The outcome of the analysis is presented with a simple visual
tool called a "nomograph". Conditional probability and total probability are
depicted in such a way that facilitates easy interpretation of results.
• Quick assessing of the facility condition: The model renders a quick explosion
probability assessment for the dust handling facility.
This study demonstrated the use of the conditional probabilistic approach and its
application as a useful tool in dust explosion prediction. It can assess dust explosion
probability based on the continuous monitoring of specific dust explosion parameters.
The developed nomograph can be used as a handy tool to use in industry as a safety
monitoring aid.
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3.6 Conclusion
Three aspects of the proposed model could be further explored in the future. First, the
chemical composition of the dust is not considered in the existing model development.
Classification of dust on the basis of chemical composition can be incorporated into
the model. This would lead to a specific dust explosion likelihood prediction model.
The recommended classifications would be:
1. Food feed
2. Plastic, resins and rubbers
3. Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, pesticides
4. Metal alloys
5. Coal and coal products
6. Cotton, wood and peat
Second, copula function needs to be further tested and developed for specifying de-
pendency scenarios, such as the correlation between Pmax and PD, Pmax and MIT etc.
Third, in the study, one parameter at a time was considered for conditional probability
estimation. To achieve better accuracy five parameters could be considered together.
This would require solving more complex mathematical functions.
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Abstract
Dust explosion is a potential threat to the process facilities handling dusts. Dust
explosion occurrences are frequently reported in these industries. Industrial profes-
sionals and researchers have been trying to develop effective measures to assess and
mitigate and/or prevent dust explosion. To develop effective prevention and mit-
igation strategies, it is important to understand the interaction of dust explosion
controlling parameters and also to assess likelihood of occurrence in given conditions.
A conceptual framework has earlier been developed by the authors to model dust ex-
plosion likelihood. In this paper, a detailed implementation of the conceptual model
is presented. Three different dust classes ( i.e. food feed; plastic, resin and rubber;
and metal alloys) are considered for model development. The proposed model consid-
ers six key parameters of dust explosion: dust particles diameter, minimum ignition
energy, minimum explosible concentration, minimum ignition temperature, limiting
oxygen concentration and explosion pressure. These parameters are conditional to the
type of dust and chemical composition. A conditional probabilistic approach is used
to determine the total probability of dust explosion in a given process facility. Use
of this model will help to assess the likelihood of dust explosion in given operating
conditions. Moreover, it will help to develop prevention strategies focusing on the
parameters that are responsible for dust explosion. Three case studies are presented
here to demonstrate the application of the model in real life.
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Keywords: Probabilistic assessment, Probability distribution, Dust explosion, Dust
explosion parameter, Nomograph
Acronyms and Symbols:
PD : Particle Diameter, micron (µm)
MEC: Minimum Explosible Concentration, g/m3
MIT: Minimum Ignition Temperature, ◦C
MIE: Minimum Ignition Energy, mJ
LOC: Limiting Oxygen Concentration, %
Pmax : Maximum Pressure Rise, bar(g)
PDF: Probability Density Function
CDF: Cumulative Density Function
µ: Mean for normal distribution
σ : Standard Deviation for normal distribution
ζ: Standard deviations for lognormal distribution
λ : Mean of lognormal distributions
β: Shape parameter for weibull distribution
θ: Scale parameter for weibull distribution
Px = P/X =: Probability of dust explosion given that a particular parameter satisfies
necessary condition (where X = PD or MEC or MIT or MIE or LOC)
PTotal : Total probability of dust explosion for a given scenario considering all param-
eters
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4.1 Introduction
A dust explosion can take place when the suspended solid particles accumulated in
the air receive sufficient energy from the source. The consequence is akin to a typical
gas explosion in terms of the impact on the surrounding environment, industrial assets
and monetary value. Unfortunately, the dust explosion’s causation and severity are
less familiar compared to the gas explosion among industrial practitioners [Amyotte
and Eckhoff, 2010]. For gas explosion, fuel, oxidant and ignition sources are neces-
sary, while dust explosion requires two more vital criteria: appropriate mixing and
confinement. These five elements are denoted with the dust explosion pentagon. The
phase of the fuel during gas and dust explosion is different. Gas particles are in a
gaseous phase, whereas dust particles are in a solid phase. Therefore, particle size of
the dust is a very important fact on which to focus. According to the National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA), any finely divided solid, 420 µm (micron) or 0.017 in.
or less in diameter (i.e., material capable of passing through a U.S. No. 40 Standard
sieve) is defined as dust [NFPA, 2008]. The prime concern is combustible dust. Any
dust capable of creating a violent explosion when it is suspended in air in ignitable
concentrations, regardless of size, shape or chemical composition is called combustible
dust [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010]. The range of explosible particle size may be larger
than the defined range for a specific material. Particle sizes distributions are often
considered as a measure of the particle diameter in addition to the mean or median
diameter [Amyotte and Eckhoff, 2010]. In this paper, the median particle diameter is
considered throughout the study.
A number of recent dust explosion phenomena caused severe loss to human lives and
associated industries. On January 29, 2003, a massive dust explosion at the West
Pharmaceutical Services facility in Kinston, North Carolina, killed six workers and
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destroyed the facility [CSB, 2004]. On February 20, 2003, a series of dust explosions at
the CTA Acoustics facility in Corbin, Kentucky, killed seven workers, injured 37, and
destroyed the facility [CSB, 2004]. On October 29, 2003, an aluminum dust fueled
explosion killed one worker and injured several others at Hayes Lemmerz Interna-
tional in Huntington, Indiana [CSB, 2005]. On January 9, 2001, at the wool factory
"Pettinatura Italiana" in Vigliano Biellese (BI), a massive explosion caused the death
of three people, five severely injured personnel and considerable damage to part of
the factory [Piccinini, 2008]. On February 7, 2008, a series of sugar dust explosions
at the Imperial sugar manufacturing facility in Port Wentworth, Georgia, resulted in
14 worker fatalities [CSB, 2009].
With the increasing number of dust explosions in process facilities, the risk has be-
come more alarming. However, substantial progress has been made through extensive
research and development for better understanding of dust explosion dynamics. Pre-
venting an ignition source and explosive dust clouds, explosion venting, automatic
explosion suppression and good housekeeping are elaborately reported in existing lit-
eratures as the means of protective measures of dust explosions [Eckhoff, 2005].
Industry professionals and researchers are striving for more pragmatic and easily im-
plementable solutions to prevent dust explosion phenomena. However, in the context
of quantitative assessment, a predictive tool to assess the explosion probability in a
particular industry is absent. In this paper, an effort has been made to establish a
probabilistic model to assess dust explosion occurrence. The model is applied for three
dust classes: Food feed; plastic, resin and rubber; and metal alloys. Five parameters
are identified as dust explosion influential parameters: particle diameter, minimum
explosible concentration, minimum ignition energy, minimum ignition temperature
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and limiting oxygen concentration, whereas the maximum explosion pressure repre-
sents the severity of a dust explosion. Five essential elements ( e.g. fuel, oxidant,
ignition source, mixing and confinement) form a dust explosion pentagon [Kauffman,
1982]. These five elements are represented by five influencing parameters of dust
explosion. When these parameters reach the explosible range, dust explosion occurs
[Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007]. Explosion may not occur if all parameters do not reach the
explosible range [NFPA, 2007]. A conceptual framework has earlier been developed
by the authors which describes the method of assessing the dust explosion probabil-
ity [Hassan et al., 2013]. In this paper, the implementation of the earlier model is
discussed elaborately for different dust classes. Three case studies have been studied
to demonstrate the applicability of the model. This paper attempts to use the ex-
isting information (experimental data) for a particular industry to develop the dust
explosion assessment model. To assess the conditional probability, two parameters at
a time have been considered to estimate the probability of explosion occurrence for a
given industry. Estimating the conditional probability for each parameter and inte-
grating them over a range provides the total probability of dust explosion occurrence.
The model renders a nomograph as a quick assessment tool. For a particular indus-
try, the model can assess the probability of explosion in the base condition (normal
operating condition). Based on the assessment, the processing facility can implement
safety measures ( e.g. inherent safety, procedural safety, safety management system
etc.) and can develop effective prevention and mitigation strategies in the working
environment.
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4.2 Methodology for dust explosion assessment and
mathematical modelling
The proposed methodology to assess dust explosion likelihood is comprised of five
steps as outlined in the conceptual model [Hassan et al., 2013]. These steps are
subdivided into several sub-steps. Figure 4.1 represents the framework of the proposed
methodology. The main steps are given below; for details see the work on dust
explosion likelihood assessment [Hassan et al., 2013].
1. Hazard identification,
2. Data collection,
3. Data analysis,
4. Probabilistic modelling,
5. Nomograph Development
4.3 Mathematical modelling of dust explosion as-
sessment
The proposed methodology employs the rules of conditional probability and an elab-
orate description is given in the recent work on dust explosion likelihood assessment
by Junaid et al [Hassan et al., 2013].
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Figure 4.1: A framework for assessing dust explosion occurrence
[Hassan et al., 2013]
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4.4 Model testing
To use the model, probability distributions of the dust explosion parameters need to
be determined for each dust class. The PDFs can be determined from the known
distribution. These PDFs are used to formulate the joint probability distribution
functions and are integrated over a range to get the CDFs. The integral range is
identified according to the available data. Hence, the conditional probability values
can be assessed for the particular dust classes. The total probability of dust explosion
can be determined from the model and the nomograph is generated as a part of the
model. The testing of the model is described in four steps with an example:
4.4.1 Data collection
In this step, data for dust explosions parameters are collected. Six parameters are
already identified in section 4.2. The data for analysis are collected from Echkoff’s
book (Appendix: Table: A1 in reference [Eckhoff, 2003]) for all the parameters except
LOC. LOC data are excerpted from the NFPA 69 (Table C.1(b) in reference [NFPA,
2008]).
4.4.2 Data analysis and PDFs determination
In this step, the collected data are analysed to determine the underlying distributions
of each identified parameter. This step provides the significant details of the distribu-
tion parameters. This information is used to determine the PDFs for each parameter.
For example, consider a case where the statistical analysis for the hazard causing
parameters is listed in Table 4.1 for a particular process facility.
The estimated parameters of the identified distributions (from Table 4.1) can be used
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Table 4.1: Dust explosion parameter distribution identification
Dust explosion
parameters
Best fitted
distribution
Estimated distribution
parameter
95% Data
range
PD Lognormal λPD=4.02, ζPD=0.95513 25-400 µm
MEC Normal µMEC=80, σMEC=45 15-215 g/m3
MIT Normal µMIT=504, σMIT=65 400-700 ◦C
MIE Lognormal λMIE=4.71518, ζMIE=1.50173 10-700 mJ
LOC Normal µLOC=10.97, σLOC=2.12468 8.75-12 % O2
Pmax Weibull βPmax=8.89, θPmax=10.7 8-10.5 bar(g)
in the mathematical formulation of the probability distribution function. Based on
the distribution types, formulated PDFs are given as:
For PD:
fPD(PD;λPD, ζPD) =
1
PDζPD
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
ln(PD)−λPD
ζPD
)2 (4.1)
For MEC:
fMEC(MEC;µMEC , σMEC) =
1
σMEC
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
MEC−µMEC
σMEC
)2 (4.2)
For MIT:
fMIT (MIT ;µMIT , σMIT ) =
1
σMIT
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
MIT−µMIT
σMIT
)2 (4.3)
For MIE:
fMIE(MIE;λMIE, ζMIE) =
1
MIEζMIE
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
ln(MIE)−λMIE
ζMIE
)2 (4.4)
For LOC:
fLOC(LOC;µLOC , σLOC) =
1
σLOC
√
2pi
e
− 12 (
LOC−µLOC
σLOC
)2 (4.5)
For Pmax:
fPmax(Pmax; βPmax , θPmax) =
βPmax
θPmax
(Pmax
θPmax
)βPmax−1e−(
Pmax
θPmax
)βPmax (4.6)
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4.4.3 Identification of integral limits and CDFs determina-
tion
The above equations (4.1 to 4.6) are used in determining joint probability distribu-
tion functions and are integrated over a specific range to get the CDFs. The range of
integral limits and CDFs are determined in this step.
For example, consider the parameter PD in the explanation. Data analysis for PD
confirms that the range of 25 µm to 400 µm covers 95% of the data (Table 4.1) which
is the addressed critical zone in this analysis. The limits for the integral reflect the
vulnerable region where a dust explosion is likely. The vulnerable region is determined
by assessing the data frequency in the specific range. The data used for the analysis
are arranged and analysed to understand the range. Data analysis for the severity
parameter Pmax confirms that most dust explosion pressure data are likely to be within
8 to 10.4 bar(g) [Eckhoff, 2003]. For the calculation, the upper bound is rounded up
to 10.5 bar(g). Analysing the dust explosion phenomenon in terms of Pmax and PD
alone, the probability of having a dust explosion due to the PD range susceptible to
explosion may be written as Equation 4.7:
P (Pmax/PD) =
∫ Pmaxcriticalmax
Pmaxcriticalmin
∫ PDcriticalmax
PDcriticalmin
P (Pmax∩PD) dPDdPmax∫ PDmax
PDmin
PDdPD
=
∫ 400
25
∫ 10.5
8 P (Pmax∩PD) dPDdPmax∫ 420
1 PDdPD
=
∫ 400
25
∫ 10.5
8 C(fPD,fpmax )∗fPD(PD;λPD,ζPD)∗fPmax (Pmax;βPmax ,θPmax ) dPDdPmax∫ 420
1 fPD(PD;λPD,ζPD)dPD
(4.7)
All the parameters and their values are already known and the functions for the PD
and Pmax are also determined from the distribution characteristics. Solving Equation
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4.7 provides the conditional probability of dust explosion due to the PD. The above
process is repeated for the rest of the parameters (MEC, MIT, MIE and LOC) with
respect to the severity parameter, Pmax. The posterior probability density function
is eventually transformed into the CDF to read the posterior conditional probability,
according to the specific range as provided in Figure 4.2 for the above analysis.
(a) Posterior probability for PD(b) Posterior probability for
MEC
(c) Posterior probability for
MIE
(d) Posterior probability for
MIT
(e) Posterior probability for
LOC
Figure 4.2: Posterior probability plot at a given condition for all the parameters.
4.4.4 Dust explosion assessment in a given operating condi-
tion
The steps described in sections [4.4.1], [4.4.2] and [4.4.3] develop the predictive model
which can be used for a specific case in the considered process facility. To use the
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model, the operating conditions of the process facility are required. For instance,
consider the following monitored data in the considered process facility. The following
process operating condition is chosen to demonstrate the applicability of the model.
• PD varies from 40 µm to 350 µm
• MEC varies within 30 g/m3 to 200 g/m3
• Upper limit for MIT is 650◦C
• Upper limit of MIE is 600 mJ
• Upper limit for LOC is 11.75(% of O2)
For the given process parameters the predictive model analyses the data and provides
the following result listed in Table 4.2. The predictive model also provides a nomo-
graph as an easy way to interpret the result in a graphical form which is given in
Figure 4.3:
Table 4.2: Nomograph calculation interface
Influencing
Parameters
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Conditional
probability
PD (25-400) 40 350 0.311 (PPD)
MEC (15-215) 30 200 0.473 (PMEC)
MIT (400-700) 400 650 0.482 (PMIT )
MIE (10-700) 10 600 0.444 (PMIE)
LOC (7-15) 7 11.75 0.223 (PLOC)
Total probability of dust explosion 0.151 (PTotal)
The calculation depicted above indicates that the occurrence probability of dust explo-
sion is 0.151 for the given conditions of the process facility. The nomograph indicates
the probability of 0.151 inside the pentagon with the shaded portion (Figure 4.3). It
shows that 1 out of 6 operations is susceptible to an explosion at the normal operat-
ing condition. The nomograph is a simple way to interpret the result of the complex
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 Figure 4.3: Nomograph for dust explosion
mathematical equation in a graphic way. The process facility can formulate necessary
prevention and mitigation strategies based on the assessment.
4.5 Identified dust classes and case studies
Three dust classes are identified to use the model in three specific industries. These
classes are food feed; plastic, resin and rubber; and metal alloys. The industries
dealing with the aforementioned dust classes can utilize the proposed model to assess
the probability of dust explosion for a normal operating condition. The dust explosion
assessment in a process facility may lead to significant modification of safety measures.
It can be very helpful to formulate effective mitigation or prevention strategies. The
proposed model includes three specific industries and they are discussed in the case
studies below:
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4.5.1 Dust class 1: Food feed
Dust produced or handled in the food processing industries is susceptible to explosion
if necessary conditions are met. The food processing industries deal with dust such
as: dextrose, fructose, coffee, milk powder, wheat flour, sugar etc. Based on the
statistical analysis on the available data of food feed, the dust explosion parameters
and the distributions are provided in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Food feed: Dust explosion parameter distribution identification
Dust explosion
parameters
Best fitted
distribution
Estimated distribution
parameter
95% Data
range
PD Lognormal λPD=4.38, ζPD=1.03 23-400 µm
MEC Lognormal λMEC=4.31, ζMEC=0.63 31-700 g/m3
MIT Lognormal λMIT=6.19, ζMIT=0.085 441-580 ◦C
MIE Lognormal λMIE=5.29, ζMIE=1.21 76-1000 mJ
LOC Normal µLOC=10.97, σLOC=2.12468 8.75-12 % O2
Pmax Normal µPmax=7.93, σPmax=1.43 5.1-10.2 bar(g)
Taking the distribution parameter into account, the conditional PDFs are formulated.
The analysis (in Table 4.3) also provides the integral range with which the conditional
PDFs are integrated to obtain the CDFs. The CDFs are represented in Figure 4.4 as
the CDF plot. The CDF plot represents the probability of dust explosion for differ-
ent operating ranges. It facilitates the reading of the conditional probability of dust
explosion for a given operating range of a single parameter.
The total probability of dust explosion is assessed using the conditional probability
of dust explosion for each parameter. The process of assessing the total probability of
dust explosion based on the plant operating condition is described in section 4.5.1.1
with a case study.
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(a) Posterior probability for PD(b) Posterior probability for
MEC
(c) Posterior probability for
MIE
(d) Posterior probability for
MIT
(e) Posterior probability for
LOC
Figure 4.4: Posterior probability plot for the parameters (dust class: food feed).
4.5.1.1 Case study: Sugar dust explosion and fire
On February 7, 2008, at about 7:15 p.m., a series of sugar dust explosions took place
at the Imperial Sugar manufacturing facility in Port Wentworth, Georgia. It resulted
in fourteen worker fatalities, and among them eight workers died at the work place
and six were extremely injured and eventually died at the Joseph M. Still Burn Cen-
ter in Augusta, Georgia. Thirty six workers were severely injured and burned which
eventually caused permanent damage to them [CSB, 2009].
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At about 7:15 p.m. on February 7, 2008, a sugar dust explosion occurred in the en-
closed steel conveyor belt under the granulated sugar storage silos in the above facility.
After a while, a massive secondary dust explosion propagated throughout the entire
granulated and powdered sugar packing buildings, bulk sugar loading buildings, and
parts of the raw sugar refinery [CSB, 2009].
The proposed model for food feed considers granulated and powdered sugar, and an
effort to assess the dust explosion probability at the Imperial sugar manufacturing
facility has been made in this section. To assess the probability of dust explosion,
understanding the operating conditions of the facility is required. This information is
collected from relevant reports available on the facility and its operation. Any missing
information regarding operational and material parameters is replaced with the proper
engineering judgement. According to US CSB, the dust explosion parameters at the
facility are reported as [CSB, 2009]:
• PD varies from 23 µm to 286 µm
• MEC range is 115 g/m3
• Upper limit for MIT is 450◦C to 500◦C
• Upper limit of MIE is 1000 mJ
• Upper limit for LOC is 10.5(% of O2)
The LOC and MIT values are chosen for the assessment. From the above plant con-
dition the predictive model assesses the facility condition. The gist of the assessment
is given in Table 4.4 and the model provides a nomograph (Figure 4.5) to understand
the plant condition easily.
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Table 4.4: Nomograph (food feed) calculation interface
Influencing
parameters
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Conditional
probability
PD (23-400) 23 286 0.76 (PPD)
MEC (31-700) 31 115 0.68 (PMEC)
MIT (441-580) 450 500 0.44 (PMIT )
MIE (76-1000) 76 1000 0.65 (PMIE)
LOC (7.25-15) 7.25 10.50 0.19 (PLOC)
Total probability of dust explosion 0.27 (PTotal)
Figure 4.5: Nomograph (food feed) for dust explosion
According to the proposed model, the total probability of dust explosion at the Impe-
rial sugar manufacturing company is 27% when the base operating condition is con-
sidered. A dust explosion took place which indicates the probability reaches 100%,
denoting the accident occurred. The accident means that something must have hap-
pened to trigger the base condition into becoming a catastrophic explosion. 27%
probability of dust explosion is a high probability. It means one out of three facilities
under normal operating condition are explosion prone. A target value of 0.001 or
one in a thousand would be a reasonable value to choose. If the probability of dust
explosion can be reduced in the normal operating condition, it will reduce the chance
of explosion during process upset conditions as well. The model also interprets that
the PD, MEC and MIE make significant contributions in the conditional probability
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(from Table 4.4). At the facility, the primary explosion took place at the enclosed
steel belt conveyor where the dust concentration accumulated to the explosive range
and an ignition source provided the necessary energy source to begin the explosion
[CSB, 2009], which validates the assessment of the model. To improve the safety of
the facility, necessary design modification is needed to the steel belt conveyor and
adequate housekeeping is required. These provide a better and safer condition for
working. The model provides a quick estimate of the plant condition. Based on the
assessment administrative controls, engineering design and operational modification
can be done to reduce the total probability of dust explosion.
4.5.2 Dust class 2: Plastic, resin and rubber
Industries dealing with the following dust: rubber, melamine resin, polyester, polyvinyl-
alcohol etc. are considered in this class. Based on the statistical analysis on the
available data for aforementioned dust classes, the probability distribution type and
details of the dust explosion parameters are listed in Table 4.5
Table 4.5: Plastic, resin and rubber: Dust explosion parameter distribution identifi-
cation
Dust explosion
parameters
Best fitted
distribution
Estimated distribution
parameter
95% Data
range
PD Lognormal λPD=4.11, ζPD=0.9296 21-280 µm
MEC Lognormal λMEC=3.993, ζMEC=0.706 31-200 g/m3
MIT Normal µMIT=528, σMIT=108.54 421-790 ◦C
MIE Lognormal λMIE=5.177, ζMIE=2.64 14-2000 mJ
LOC Normal µLOC=10.97, σLOC=2.12468 8.75-12 % O2
Pmax Normal µPmax=8.432, σPmax=1.04 6.2-10.2 bar(g)
The model analyses the data and provides the conditional probability with respect to
each parameter. The analysis is depicted with a CDF plot and represented by Figure
4.6. For a single parameter at any condition within operational range the plot can
provide the conditional probability of dust explosion. The assessment of the total
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probability of dust explosion from the conditional probabilities is discussed in section
4.5.2.1.
(a) Posterior probability for PD(b) Posterior probability for
MEC
(c) Posterior probability for
MIE
(d) Posterior probability for
MIT
(e) Posterior probability for
LOC
Figure 4.6: Posterior probability plot for the parameters (dust class: plastic, resin
and rubber).
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4.5.2.1 Case study: Dust explosion in wool factory
On 9 January, 2001, at the wool factory “Pettinatura Italiana” in Vigliano Biellese
(BI), at 5:50 p.m. a massive explosion caused the death of three people, the injury
of another five, and severe facility damage [Piccinini, 2008]. For over a century, the
factory has been devoted to washing, carding, and combing wool. The production
cycle which is described includes the extraction from the wool of several types of
industrial rejects (e.g., burr) and waste (e.g., noils). A large amount of dust accumu-
lated which was a by-product of the removal of burr from wool during the carding
phase. A primary deflagration initiated by some electrical equipment of the lighting
system caused a spark or source of heat. The flame front of the primary deflagration
propagated quickly and ignited large quantities of dust.
An unusual explosive material was reported as a mixture of vegetable dust, wool
fibers, and inorganic substances [Piccinini, 2008]. According to the estimation the de-
flagration involved at least 400−500 kg of flammable vegetal and wool fibres, without
counting moisture and inert particles [Piccinini, 2008]. According to the technical re-
ports [NFPA, 2008, Piccinini, 2008, Eckhoff, 2003] and standard material properties,
the following plant conditions are determined for the study:
• PD varies from 25 µm to 150 µm
• MEC range is 125 g/m3
• Upper limit for MIT is 450◦C to 500◦C
• Upper limit of MIE is 200 mJ
• Upper limit for LOC is 10.5(% of O2)
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Based on the normal operating condition the dust explosion assessment model pro-
vides conditional probability and eventually is aggregated to the total probability of
explosion. The conditional probabilities, total probability and the generated nomo-
graph are provided in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7 subsequently.
Table 4.6: Nomograph (plastic, resin and rubber) calculation interface
Influencing
parameters
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Conditional
probability
PD (21-280) 25 150 0.66 (PPD)
MEC (31-200) 31 125 0.66 (PMEC)
MIT (421-790) 450 500 0.17 (PMIT )
MIE (14-2000) 14 200 0.49 (PMIE)
LOC (7.25-15) 7.25 10.50 0.25 (PLOC)
Total probability of dust explosion 0.44 (PTotal)
Figure 4.7: Nomograph (plastic, resin and rubber) for dust explosion
During the normal operational condition the total probability of dust explosion in the
above industry is 44%. This means that, one out of two operations are susceptible to
explosion, which is a high probability for a process facility. The nomograph provides
a quick summary of the conditional probabilities and total probability of dust explo-
sion. The occurrence of dust explosion indicates a process upset or standard work
procedure breach. Table 4.6 shows that PD, MEC and MIE make significant contri-
butions to the total probability of dust explosion. The investigation of this accident
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also notes the ignition source (electrical system of the lighting system) and explosible
concentration which caused the initiation of the primary explosion [Piccinini, 2008].
Based on the quantitative analysis, an industry practitioner, design engineer or ad-
ministrative personnel can modify the safety measures, work procedures or managerial
control to reduce the probability of explosion in normal operating condition. The pro-
posed model provides a simple assessment of dust explosion probability in the normal
operating conditions for industries handling dust plastic, resin and rubber.
4.5.3 Dust class 3: Metal alloys
In this class the considered dusts are: aluminum powder, bronze powder, manganese,
silicon, ferrochromium etc. Industries dealing with such dusts are considered in this
class and the result of the statistical analysis for dust explosion parameters of such
dust class is listed below:
Table 4.7: Metal alloys: Dust explosion parameter distribution identification
Dust explosion
parameters
Best fitted
distribution
Estimated distribution
parameter
95% Data
range
PD Lognormal λPD=3.397, ζPD=1.034 23-250 µm
MEC Lognormal λMEC=4.8, ζMEC=1.034 31-500 g/m3
MIT Normal µMIT=700.28, σMIT=156.98 381-800 ◦C
MIE Lognormal λMIE=5.14, ζMIE=1.39 41-250 mJ
LOC Normal µLOC=10.97, σLOC=2.12468 8.75-12 % O2
Pmax Normal µPmax=8.64, σPmax=2.29 5.2-12.4 bar(g)
Analysing the dust explosion parameters and their distribution, the PDFs are deter-
mined. These PDFs are integrated over a specific operational range to get the CDFs.
The range is determined from the analysis presented in Table 4.7. The CDFs are
plotted in Figure 4.8. This enables the determination of the conditional probability
of dust explosion for a single parameter in metal handling facilities.
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4.5.3.1 Case study: Aluminum dust explosion
At about 8:30 p.m. on Wednesday, October 29, 2003, an aluminum dust explosion and
fire occurred at the Hayes Lemmerz International Huntington Inc. (Hayes) facility in
Huntington, Indiana.
One employee was engulfed in fire and eventually died and two employees were severely
burned. Three employees had minor injuries. The explosion took place in the scrap
(a) Posterior probability for PD(b) Posterior probability for
MEC
(c) Posterior probability for
MIE
(d) Posterior probability for
MIT
(e) Posterior probability for
LOC
Figure 4.8: Posterior probability plot for the parameters (dust class: metal alloy).
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reprocessing area, near the furnaces in the aluminum casting plant. The explosion
completely destroyed dust collection equipment which was placed outside the building
[CSB, 2005]. Equipment inside the building received minor damage. The explosion
also lifted a portion of the building roof above one furnace and ignited a fire; insula-
tion and other combustible materials burned for several hours [CSB, 2005].
Based on the technical reports [NFPA, 2008, CSB, 2005, Eckhoff, 2003] and standard
material properties the following plant conditions are determined for the study:
• PD varies from 25 µm to 85 µm
• MEC range is 50 g/m3
• Upper limit for MIT is 450◦C to 500◦C
• Upper limit of MIE is 240 mJ
• Upper limit for LOC is 10.5(% of O2)
For the above operational condition, the model assesses the conditional probabilities,
and using the information, the total probability of dust explosion is calculated. The
conditional probabilities and total probability of dust explosion are listed in Table
4.8. The predictive model also provides a nomograph to represent the plant condition
in terms of probability of explosion and is depicted in Figure 4.9.
Under normal operational conditions the probability of dust explosion at Hays Lem-
merz International was 11%. This means that one out of eight operations is prone
to explosion, which is a high probability. Table 4.8 shows that PD, MEC and MIE
make higher contribution to dust explosion occurrence. From the technical report
it is also evident that, the dust collector system was not designed properly and the
chip system was releasing excess dust, which was unreported before the explosion took
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Table 4.8: Nomograph (metal alloy) calculation interface
Influencing
parameters
Lower
bound
Upper
bound
Conditional
probability
PD (23-250) 25 85 0.45 (PPD)
MEC (31-500) 31 50 0.11 (PMEC)
MIT (381-800) 450 500 0.04 (PMIT )
MIE (41-250) 41 240 0.48 (PMIE)
LOC (7.25-15) 7.25 10.50 0.23 (PLOC)
Total probability of dust explosion 0.11 (PTotal)
Figure 4.9: Nomograph (metal alloys) for dust explosion
place [CSB, 2005]. To reduce the explosion probability in normal operating conditions
industries should focus on applicability of fire prevention standards, dust generation
and hazard awareness, engineering project management, safety reviews for new and
modified systems, and operating and maintenance practices. Adopting such modifi-
cations will minimize the probability of explosion in standard operating conditions
which will reduce the probability of process upset conditions as well.
4.6 Discussion
This paper illustrates a novel approach of estimating dust explosion probability in
specific operating conditions. The proposed model assesses dust explosion probabil-
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ity based on the operating conditions. The model is studied with three case studies
considering three dust classes: food feed; plastic, resin and rubber; and metal alloys.
The model described in the paper consists of three parts. The first part is monitoring
the data. In a specific industry the hazard causing parameters are: PD, MEC, MIE,
MIT and LOC. PD, MEC and LOC are monitored and the obtained data are used in
the predictive model for dust explosion likelihood assessment. MIT and MIE are ma-
terial parameters and the specific range depends on the dust material. These values
are chosen for the specific dust materials.
After obtaining the necessary data, the second step is the mathematical analysis of
data and probability estimation. The model analyses the conditional probability for
each parameter and estimates the total probability of dust explosion.
The final step of the model provides a nomograph as a quick estimate of the prob-
ability of dust explosion at a given facility. The nomograph is a simplified visual
representation of the rigorous analysis process and makes the model easier to inter-
pret. The nomograph provides the assessment of explosion probability in the facility
in the base operational condition. Based on the assessment, the designers, engineers
and workers can modify their safety measures ( e.g. inherent safety, procedural safety,
safety management system etc.) and can formulate effective preventive and mitigatory
measures to reduce the probability of explosion to provide a safe working environment.
The proposed model is very convenient and effective in the following ways:
• Easier implementation: The model consists of systematic structured steps and
requires very simple techniques to follow. Moreover, the simplified mathematical
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steps reduce the data processing and modelling time significantly.
• Easy to interpret: The outcome of the analysis is presented with a simple visual
tool called a "nomograph". Conditional probability and total probability are
depicted this way to facilitate easy interpretation of results.
• Quick assessing of the plant’s base condition: The model renders a quick assess-
ment of explosion probability in operating conditions for specific dust handling
facilities.
• A condition based approach: This condition based probabilistic model that will
help to assess dust explosion likelihood for a given facility condition.
4.7 Conclusion
The objective of this paper is to discuss a recently proposed model for dust explo-
sion likelihood assessment and to demonstrate its application to real life. Three dust
classes are taken into consideration with case studies. Using a conditional probabilis-
tic method enables the model to assess the likelihood of dust explosion for a given
operating condition. The model can assess the total probability of explosion in the
normal operating condition for a particular process facility. Based on the assessment,
the process facility can implement safety measures ( e.g. inherent safety, procedural
safety, safety management system etc.) and can develop effective prevention and mit-
igation strategies to achieve a safer working environment.
Two aspects of the model could be further explored in the future. First, the model can
be applied to other dust classes based on chemical compositions that are not covered
in this study. A few recommended classifications are:
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• Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics and pesticides
• Coal and coal products
• Cotton, wood and peat
Second, copula function requires further testing to develop better dependency scenar-
ios, such as the correlation between Pmax and PD, Pmax and LOC etc.
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Chapter 5
Summary, Conclusions and
Recommendation
5.1 summary
A review of existing prevention and mitigation measures provides insight into lim-
itations of the process system safety. It is evident that the majority of existing
safety measures focus on dust explosion prevention and mitigation without consid-
ering any quantitative assessment of explosions occurrence in normal operating con-
ditions. Moreover, these existing measures do not provide any assessment on dust
explosion occurrence for an specific dust class. As a result, the existing safety system
has no ability to determine the likelihood of the dust explosion occurrence. A predic-
tive model to determine dust explosion probability at a given operating condition is
absent in the contemporary literature.
The present study used probabilistic approaches in dust explosion assessment in pro-
cessing facilities. It has focused on the estimation of dust explosion occurrence prob-
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ability in the facility for a given operating condition.
A conceptual model is proposed to assess the dust explosion probability at process
facility in chapter 3. A conditional probabilistic approach is used to developed the
model. The model was further implemented in real life scenario and discussed elabo-
rately in chapter 4. Three different dust classes: food feed; plastic, resin and rubber
and metal alloys are incorporated in the model to assess the dust explosion probability
in the industries associated with these dust particles. For each cases, the developed
model is tested with case studies.
5.2 Conclusions
The proposed model in this study is capable of assessing the dust explosion probability
based on the operational condition of the facility. A generic model is proposed to
understand the underlying concept behind and further elaborated for specific cases
to demonstrate the applicability in industrial aspect. For each cases, real time events
are considered as case studies and the feasibility of the proposed model is assessed.
Based on the assessment, the designers, engineers and workers can modify their safety
measure ( e.g. Inherent safety, procedural safety, safety management system etc.) and
can formulate effective preventive and mitigatory measures to reduce the probability
of explosion to provide safe working environment.
5.3 Recommendations
The present work attempts to introduce new concepts and also overcome the limita-
tion of existing safety measures of the process industries. This study, however, can
be extended further in following ways:
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First, the model can be applied for other dust classes based on the chemical compo-
sition that are not covered in this study. Some recommended classifications are:
1. Pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, pesticides
2. Coal and coal products
3. Cotton, wood and peat
Second, copula function needs to be further tested and developed for specifying de-
pendency scenarios, such as the correlation between Pmax and PD, Pmax and MIT etc.
Third, in the study, one parameter at a time was considered for conditional prob-
ability estimation. To achieve better accuracy five parameters could be considered
together. This would require solving more complex mathematical functions.
Fourth, a real time monitoring system can be utilized to observe and analyze the
process parameters. A predictive alarm based system can also be implemented to
monitor and assess the system continuously. It will provide a real time assessment of
dust explosion occurrence.
Fifth, an uncertainty analysis can be integrated in the model to develop confidence
on the estimated probability.
Sixth, the developed model can be integrated with the consequence model to estimate
risk. The estimated risk may be used in designing or developing prevention strategies.
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